its proximity to the US market, its receipt of considerable financial assistance funneled through bilateral agreements and multinational organizations, and its need for repeated interventions by the United States and the U.N. in the past 15 years, why has Haiti's general condition continued to deteriorate? This SRP therefore explores the causes of Haiti's plight. It identifies weaknesses in the U.N. strategy to stabilize Haiti and proposes changes to enable the current strategy to create a stable and secure Haitian environment.
HAITI: THE NEED FOR A STRONGER APPROACH
Judging by the tumultuous events that have plagued Haiti over the past 15 years, it is apparent that the international community's timid response had limited effect addressing the deeply rooted problems of Haiti's political instability, institutional corruption, and widespread poverty. This SRP explores the efforts underway by the United Nations (U.N.) to bring security and development to this troubled country. It concludes with recommendations for a more successful strategy.
The Long Road to Instability
Like many of its neighbors, Haiti served as a colonial hub of the slave trade.
However, unlike its neighbors, Haiti was able to revolt and break its links with its colonial masters, thereby becoming the first black independent country on 1 January 1804. 1 One would assume that this newly found freedom from colonialism would allow Haiti to prosper. Instead, the leaders of the revolution imposed "an iron-fisted caste system upon the country". 2 So, since its creation the political and economic elites have tended to behave more "as protection rackets than as custodians of the public good". 3 This perpetuated an environment of conflict between Haiti's privileged minority and the impoverished majority; it promoted the use of violence as an acceptable engine to force political change or to maintain the status quo. 4 Notwithstanding that the most recent elections in 2006 were hailed as a success, the legacy of successive failing governments has created numerous challenges preventing any democratic reforms to take hold. Although most of the new ministers following the 2006 elections are technically competent, they lack the benefit of inheriting a properly functioning parliamentary system, so they have little experience in the process of compromise and coalition-building. So they are often unable to reach consensus on key reform issues and to respond to popular economic demands. Their ability to effect the required change is further limited by a poorly trained and corrupt bureaucracy, a complex and ineffective local government system, and a crumbling infrastructure. 5 The legacy of Haiti's perpetual state of political turmoil has also kept the country at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. "Haiti's protracted economic decline is the story of rapacious governments and well-intentioned but damaging foreign interventions." 6 Even the brief economic boom in the 1980s, based primarily on the development of a new Haitian export assembly industry that was promoted by international financial institutions (IFI), failed to provide long-term benefits to the country because it relied too heavily on the U.S. market and eventually fell victim to U.S. import quotas and consumer preferences. Despite declining returns, IFIs continued to advocate assembly export. They naïvely believed that dictators and the exploitative elite Thankfully, the Préval government that was elected in 2006 carried on with the same policy framework. By the end of 2007, the economy had grown by 2.5% to 4% and inflation had shrunk from 43% to 10%. 7 However, it remains clear that in spite of these promising indicators, by any measure Haiti remains in a dire situation and the international community needs to maintain its presence to implement much needed reforms and projects. 8 The Human
Development Report which combines measures of life expectancy, literacy, and income, to finance up to 60% of its basic operations. 21 The Haitian Diaspora is more than just the primary source of foreign assistance funding for Haiti, it is also a ready reserve of skilled labor. Unfortunately, it has never been fully exploited domestically due to Haitian legal red tape and bureaucratic inefficiency that have not only discouraged potential investments but also discouraged the return of skilled and educated expatriates. 23 The challenge is also for the international community that relies on the Haitian government to deliver these programs, the same government that has historically been plagued with corruption and incapable of delivering even the most basic of public services and security for its population.
Since the government has historically proven unable to create a stable environment, it is therefore not surprising that it has not been able to provide security for its population, the primary responsibility of any government. Haiti's security apparatus has instead been misused to keep the government in power and the population in were actually present for duty. 24 The Haitian judicial and correctional systems have proven to be as dysfunctional and corrupt as the police. "Judges are untrained, inept, and corrupt; records are not kept, evidence is lost, and few, if any, criminal cases are brought to trial. Prisons are crammed with inmates. In Port-au-Prince, the National Prison is filled to eight times its capacity and less than 10 percent of Haiti's prisoner population has been convicted and many will never be formally charged"
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. Unfortunately, this situation is not likely to change in the short term since many organized gangs and criminals remain free to walk the streets due to the failures of previous security sector reforms 26 and the extradition and return of Haitian criminals, who then train recruits for the criminal gangs and organizations of Haiti.
27
Notwithstanding these huge security challenges, the problems facing Haiti are not unique amongst third world countries. Today's globalization gives "every conflict regional and global repercussions". 28 Therefore, considering the large number of poor countries around the globe, why has Haiti been able to continually attract so much attention and support from the international community and, more specifically, from the U.S.?
In accordance with the 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), the first and probably the most important rationale is that a stable Haiti enhances U.S. national security. The 2002 NSS clearly states that "poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders". 29 These conditions certainly characterize Haiti, and they were subsequently confirmed by the US State Department in 2007 when it reported that Haiti was "a major transit country for cocaine from South America because of its weak institutions, pervasive corruption, and dysfunctional police and judicial systems." This U.S. national conscience might also compel it to remain engaged in order to rectify its string of policy failures that have contributed to the current mayhem. 36 Finally, considering that Haiti is the closest of the world's poor countries at a mere 600 miles from the Florida coast, the U.S. has more than enough reasons to focus, customize, and prioritize a large portion of its assistance and development efforts to help Haiti overcome its political, economic, and security challenges.
Are U.S. interests for a stable Haiti shared by the international community? One could argue that the successive deployments of international forces to Haiti over the past 15 years are an indication that the international community also shares some of the same strategic concerns as the U.S. In fact, it was UN Secretary General Kofi Annan during the Haitian crisis who best described the world's interest and responsibility in Haiti:
Haiti is clearly unable to sort itself out, and the effect of leaving it alone would be worsening chaos. Our globalized world cannot afford such political vacuum, whether in the mountains of Afghanistan or on the very doorstep of the sole remaining superpower. 37 The Steep Climb to Stability
However, in spite of this international interest, led by the United States, France and Canada, the results leave much to be desired. 38 The first UN intervention in Haiti began in 1990 with the establishment of the UN Observer Group for the Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) 39 . What followed were a successive mix of sanctions and civilian, military and/or police missions that failed to bring lasting peace and security to
Haiti. 40 In spite of recent progress and ongoing goodwill, the lack of an overarching decision-making framework and cohesion within the international community creates its own obstacles and may impede further improvement. 54 While this lack of coherence allows Haitian politicians to play one donor against another, it is the Haitian bureaucracy that finds itself buried in paperwork because every international and bilateral assistance program has its own application process and accounting system. 55 This problem is further compounded by Haiti's shortage of qualified bureaucrats and by the dysfunctional institutions in which they operate. In addition to reducing the unmanageable administrative demands that their programs impose, the international community will therefore have to dedicate considerable effort to build the capacity and professionalism of Haiti's public servants, and improve internal controls that will reduce corruption.
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Reducing corruption requires effective judicial and security apparatus. However, according to a recent UN report, "the State institutions responsible for guaranteeing respect for the rule of law, including the police, the justice and prison systems, remain particularly weak." 57 Since the security sector has historically been the most corrupt sector and has the potential to offset any positive transformation in all other sectors, it is essential that all security sector reforms be underpinned by an effective vetting process for those who will operate within it. Such processes are not new for the UN and could even be modeled on the success of other missions like Kosovo, in which a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between UNMIK, UNOPS, the EU and the U.S.
recently established an international process and standard for the vetting and appointment of judges and prosecutors 58 .
Since security reforms must address three interdependent sectors ─ police, judicial and correctional, they must be well coordinated and performed concurrently. It is not the proximity to the water's edge that gives this shanty town international visibility. First, contrary to other shanty towns, due to the topography of the area, the sound of gunshots fired in Cité Soleil can be easily heard from most major hotels located on the hillside, where most international visitors and journalists reside. More importantly, by analyzing a detailed city map of Port-au-Prince, a trained eye can discern that Cité Soleil sits at the strategic junction of several key infrastructures (see Figure 1 ).
Figure 1. Cité Soleil
To the east, at a short walking distance, is Haiti's international airport terminal.
This airport has a single runway oriented East-West, so any aircraft attempting to land from or take-off to the west follows a flight path a few hundred meters over Cité Soleil. Lastly, to the east, just on the other side of RN1, is Cité Militaire, the capital's main business district, where many of the international and national companies have their manufacturing plants and warehouses. These companies naturally selected this location due to its close proximity to the port, airport, and national highway.
Unfortunately, these companies and their workforce provide a ready source of funds to the armed gangs of Cité Soleil through various extortion and protection schemes.
A Better Road
Considering the Haitian Government's and the international community's past performances to bring peace and stability to this country, no one could be faulted for looking at the current efforts with a certain degree of skepticism. While the international community must be given full credit for stepping forward, not once, but repeatedly over the past 15 years, they must also shoulder the blame for downsizing and pulling out before real political, social, and economic change could take hold. Therefore any strategy that truly aims to achieve success in Haiti must incorporate several new enabling requirements.
First, since Haiti remains "a poster child for the failure of international interventions in crisis states, largely due to the revolving-door nature of UN missions in
Haiti," 64 the international community must guarantee its level of efforts over a much longer period by giving MINUSTAH a multi-year mandate. MINUSTAH's most recent mandate is for one year. Similar to the long-term horizons envisioned to rebuild war-torn Japan and Germany half a century ago, rebuilding failing or failed states today must be considered in terms of decades, not months or years. However, as demonstrated by the successive missions deployed in the 1990s, the international community appears to be afflicted by a short attention span, avoiding the difficult commitment to sustain troops and funding over a long period of time. 65 Furthermore, some countries may be unwilling to associate themselves with a long-term military, police, or civilian presence, which could trigger the resentment of Haitians. 66 Regardless of the cause, the reality is that the international climate fluctuates constantly and that the international community must prioritize scarce resources and constantly shift its focus and assistance to respond to emerging conflicts. Unfortunately, the UN Security Council's (UNSC) insistence on approving missions for periods no longer than 12 months exacerbate this
shortsightedness. This epidemic of myopic time horizons is not conducive to the development of long-term plans and the implementation of lasting solutions. Therefore, for missions like Haiti, the UN needs to set long-term objectives and approve multi-year mandates to reach them. its freedom endangered rather than helping to secure it?" 67 However, when a decision has been made to intervene, the UN should not be satisfied with stabilizing a volatile situation so that it can withdraw at the earliest opportunity, leaving the population in the hands of a corrupt government. Since abuse of authority and corruption has been the modus operandi for Haitian governments over the past two hundred years, it is reasonable to assume that it will take more than a couple of years, most likely generations, to establish a culture that respects human rights, and promotes justice and democracy in Haitian society. 68 Therefore, the mandate needs to be strongly worded in such a manner that it is clear that the UN will remain in Haiti until its objectives are met, and if necessary, that the UN is empowered to act without the approval of the Haitian government.
The third requirement is for an appropriately resourced strategic plan designed to achieve the long-term rebuilding and development objectives of the mandate. A simple Google search for "plan for Haiti" reveals over 13 million websites, articles, and documents. Therefore, with so many plans, why so little progress? In essence, the bestlaid plans can fail if insufficient resources are applied. Many donor countries funnel their assistance through NGOs or directly to the Haitian Government to better control their projects. However, considering Haiti's legacy of corruption, it is fair to assume that a significant portion of the assistance never reaches their intended targets. Therefore, to maximize the impact of the international assistance, countries need to agree to not only funnel their funding through the UN, but to provide funding for the entire period of the mandate.
Even if the strategic plan is properly resourced for the duration of the mandate, it can still fail if improperly executed. Therefore, the fourth requirement is to establish a control structure to streamline decision-making and coordination. The Haitian government and various international organizations have recognized the need for coordination, but have yet to agree on how to implement it. 69 The ideal structure would be composed of a coordination centre that empowers a single decision-maker to set priorities. Some have recommended that international assistance be "implemented through the Haitian government whenever possible… instead of channeling assistance exclusively through non-governmental organizations." 70 projects. But because poverty is a long-standing, country-wide problem that will most likely persist in the foreseeable future, these solutions can best be described as shortterm fixes.
To fundamentally address the security threat posed by Cité Soleil, the town itself needs to be physically moved away from its strategically important location (See Figure 2 ). Certainly relocation of a city is a radical measure. But, if done properly, it would not only remove the menacing control that Cité Soleil exercises over the strategically vital junction where air, sea, and land transport converge, but it would also provide Haiti, and more importantly the citizens of Cité Soleil, with long-term social and economic benefits. The benefits of this approach would not only be felt in the security realm, but would ripple in the humanitarian and economic realms. The residents of Cité Soleil would not only provide the bulk of the work force to destroy, move, and rebuild a new Cité Soleil, but would also be employed to build and later work in the newly developed business and manufacturing district. This alone would generate much needed income for thousands of Haitians and tax revenues for the government. Furthermore, since the new business district would be located immediately adjacent to the port, airport, and national highway with a ready source of low-wage labor, the Haitian government should find it easier to entice foreign investors to establish new industries. All of this activity would contribute to create the type of social and economic changes that current humanitarian and aid projects have been incapable of delivering.
Conclusion
Throughout its history, Haitian society has demonstrated tremendous resilience in the face of unrelenting adversity. Fuelled by a strong nationalistic pride, this resilience has enabled Haiti to survive. Although it has survived, it has not prospered.
So far, although many countries have tried, they have been unsuccessful in helping Haiti to overcome its legacy of political unrest, rampant poverty, institutional corruption, and crumbling infrastructure. MINUSTAH represents another attempt by the international community to bring good governance, security, and economic improvement to the citizens of Haiti. While this UN Mission is a step in the right direction, it still faces many challenges, some indigenous to Haiti, others resident in the web of international interests. Only time will tell if the international community will have the wisdom and fortitude to give MINUSTAH a stronger mandate with the required tools to implement it and the staying power to see the difficult and lengthy transformational changes to their successful conclusion.
